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Abstract: 
The period of growing tensions between the US and Russia (2013-2019) saw mutual accusations 
of digital interference, disinformation, fake news, and propaganda, particularly following the 
Ukraine crisis and the 2016 US presidential election. This paper asks how the US and Russia 
represent each other’s and their own propaganda, its threat and power over audiences. We examine 
these representations in US and Russian policy documents and online articles from public 
diplomacy media Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and RT. The way propaganda is 
framed, (de)legitimized and securitized has crucial implications for public understanding of crises, 
policy responses, and future diplomacy. We demonstrate how propaganda threats have become a 
major part of the discourse about the US-Russia relationship in recent years, prioritizing state-
centered responses and disempowering audiences. 
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Introduction 
How we talk and think about different forms of propaganda in different discursive arenas is crucial 
to the policies and strategies that result. This article compares the Russian and American public 
discourse around mutual propaganda activities at the time of their declining political relations 
(2013-2019), and explores the following question: How do they construct propaganda threats and 
appropriate responses? Our project rests on the principle that, while authoritarian and democratic 
systems of propaganda differ greatly, it is valuable to consider these together as interacting 
discourses, with implications not just for scholarship but for public understanding of crises, future 
diplomacy and policy. We explore US and Russian mutual constructions of propaganda threat, 
conceptions of its power over audiences, and representations of self/other propaganda activities. 
We examine US and Russian key policy documents that put forward legal frameworks and 
strategic visions for media, information, and PD, and compare the representations of propaganda 
in the two countries’ state-funded PD media Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and RT.  
The article argues for a more productive framing of the power of propaganda and public 
diplomacy, both in the US-Russian context and beyond. We argue that the current fear-driven US 
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and Russian discourse about propaganda drives policy responses and public reactions that 
prioritize an empowered state and disempowered citizens, with consequences for foreign policy, 
the public, and journalism. Both sides tend to see propaganda simply as an external-only threat 
and represent it through conflict-related language, despite the complexity of a rapidly expanding 
global influence economy. Propaganda is matched to agents and solutions that further diminish the 
agency of the audiences and enhance state-driven propaganda and censorship, instead of non-
dominative responses that would enhance civil society, transparency and enable free speech. 
 
Propaganda and Public Diplomacy Media  
The definition of propaganda has been contested by many. Propaganda theorist Harold Lasswell’s 
(1927: 4) negative portrayal describes “the management of opinions and attitudes by the direct 
manipulation”. Yet negative definitions offer limited analytical clarity, since the term is often used 
simply to dismiss the opponent’s point of view. In this paper, we adopt Taylor’s neutral definition 
of propaganda as “a process by which an idea or an opinion is communicated to someone else for 
a specific persuasive purpose” (2003: 7). With a neutral definition, the ethics of a propaganda 
strategy consider the methods used, the desired and actual outcomes, and whose interests it is 
intended to serve. 
Public diplomacy (PD) is one tool governments traditionally use for extending international 
influence and advancing foreign policy objectives by engaging with foreign publics. PD took off 
when the US sought to replace the term “propaganda” for describing its foreign population 
influence, to distinguish US propaganda activities from those used in Nazi Germany or the Soviet 
Union (see Cull 2006). While PD and propaganda overlap, not least in their purpose of serving a 
country’s interests through influencing public opinion, and some consider propaganda an umbrella 
term which embraces PD and other tools (Briant 2015a), others have tried to differentiate PD as 
“persuasion by means of dialogue” and more open to listening to and engaging audiences 
(Melissen 2005: 18). As Brown (2008) has put it, “the best public diplomacy achieves credibility 
through careful presentation of fact and thoughtful argumentation, while the worst propaganda 
achieves credibility by falsification and sensationalism”. Towards the 2000’s, PD became more 
popular internationally, particularly during the War on Terror (Briant 2015a) and amid increased 
political attention to the concept of soft power (Nye 2004). Gregory (2008) defines PD as a 
political instrument which is “used by states, associations of states, and nonstate actors to 
understand cultures, attitudes, and behavior; build and manage relationships; and influence 
opinions and actions to advance interests and values.” PD involves impact on public opinion in 
other countries by means beyond traditional diplomacy, such as intercultural communication and 
exchanges, cultural diplomacy, advocacy, and international broadcasting (Jowett and O’Donnell 
2012), with the aim of “increasing awareness, managing reputations, changing legislation or 
altering attitudes” (Simons 2014: 441). More recently, the spread of social media has given rise to 
“Public Diplomacy 2.0” which includes new communication channels and strategies (Cull 2013). 
International broadcasting is an important part of PD strategies, as it involves ‘the use of electronic 
media by one society to shape the opinion of the people and leaders of another’ (Price 2003: 53). 
PD media help deliver messages and images to foreign publics to the advantage of an international 
actor. As Rawnsley (2015) argues, the success of PD media depends on finding the balance 
between being seen to provide professional journalism and trustworthy news on the one hand and 
3 
 
advancing the interests of the state they represent on the other. The configurations, outputs, and 
impact of PD media therefore involve the wider context of media systems and how societies 
understand the role of journalism. 
The US and Russia present a case of two major international actors with conflicting political 
interests, a long history of mutual propaganda activities, and considerably different media systems. 
Relations between the US and Russia, particularly following the Ukraine crisis and 2016 US 
presidential election, have been marked by increased tensions, expanded propaganda efforts, and 
falling public trust in journalism and democratic politics. Accusations of “fake news”, digital 
interference, “computational propaganda” (Woolley and Howard 2017), and strategic hacking 
underlie widespread calls for the state and media organisations to respond to the new “post-truth 
politics” (see Hutchings 2017). US responses have included investment in PD, blacklists of “fake 
news” websites, removal of disinformation from social media, a new National Cyber Strategy, 
registration of Russian state-run media as “foreign agents”, and debates on new state bills that 
would aim to improve public media literacy. Russia has restricted foreign ownership of media, 
passed new laws on countering “fake news” and misinformation, increased investment in its own 
PD media, and similarly introduced a “foreign agents” list. However, propaganda and PD 
configurations differ considerably between the US and Russian systems, including their domestic 
and foreign contexts, the role of the state, media protections and restrictions, and target audiences. 
 
US public diplomacy media  
Propaganda has played a key role in every US conflict since the war of independence, both 
for securing support for government action and as a tool in warfare and foreign policy. The first 
US systematic propaganda efforts during WW1, criticized for “heavy-handedness and deception”, 
created public hostility which led the government to adopt an official “strategy of truth” – while 
funding private organisations to persuade on its behalf (Howell 1997). US domestic media evolved 
a professionalized, market-dominated ‘liberal’ model with an established history of constitutional 
protections for media independence from the state (Siebert et al, 1963; Hallin & Mancini, 2004). 
In this landscape, commercial organizations played a prominent role in propaganda (Bernhard 
1999; Snow 2014; Sproule 1997; Snow 2014), with governmental communications deliberately 
differentiated from totalitarian states’ direct control.  
Democratic traditions organize propaganda through doctrine, law, and oversight, and 
distinguish that for foreign audiences and in conflict (such as PD and Psychological Operations) 
from Public Affairs for the US and global media (see Jowett and O’Donnell 2012). Snow and 
Taylor (2006) described this as a “democratic propaganda model”, essentially truthful and 
restrained in its means, with respect for diverse viewpoints. While propaganda is still critiqued as 
not truly democratic (see Bacevich 2006; Entman 2008; Herman and Chomsky 1988), some argue 
it can be compatible with democracy, facilitating public discourse and political participation (Seib 
2009; Puddington 2000; Welch 1999). Tensions between the ideal of democracy and practice of 
propaganda lead many political theorists to argue that democracies should be more deliberative 
(Dryzek 2000; Guttman and Thompson 2004). Globalization and convergence brought both 
concentrations of media power and diffuse interactive media (Shister, 2003; Hallin & Mancini, 
2017), together favoring populism (Benkler et al, 2018). An internet initially heralded as 
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democratizing, increasingly raises concerns over enabling accelerated dissemination and targeting 
of propaganda from sources foreign and domestic (Briant 2015b; Hindman, 2018; Zuboff, 2019). 
The idea of democracies’ external PD broadcasters encouraging democratic processes in 
less free parts of the world has largely underpinned the proclaimed mission of US PD broadcasters 
since the Cold War. Under the US Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1947, known as 
the Smith-Mundt Act, the US extended its narrative via broadcasters like Radio Free Europe (RFE) 
and sister station Radio Liberty (RL). Both were critical to the CIA’s clandestine efforts in the 
Cold War (Cummings 2008) and claimed to be countering the “Big Lies of Communism with the 
Truth” (Feinberg 2013). As Hill (2001) indicates they were conceived in opposition to offer “an 
alternative to the highly censored Radio Warsaws and Radio Moscows of the communist world.” 
RFE/RL combined funding and oversight by the CIA and policy guidance by the Department of 
State, with editorial decentralization and the more credible reporting of news both supporting and 
criticizing US policies (Johnson 2018). Today, RFE/RL mission is to “promote democratic values 
and institutions by reporting the news in countries where a free press is banned by the government 
or not fully established” (RFE/RL, n.d.). RFE/RL now funded by an annual budget of $124 million 
from the US Congress through the United States Agency for Global Media, supports 26 languages, 
and reaches an estimated weekly audience of 33.9 million people. Disseminating government-
produced programming (including RFE/RL) within the US was prohibited until 2013, and the 
repeal of this ban raised concerns over government capabilities to influence public opinion at home 
(Sager 2015; Briant 2018). 
Amid difficulty reaching audiences in Russia, in 2014, RFE/RL launched Current Time (in 
partnership with Voice of America) – a daily Russian-language TV news programme (since 2016, 
a TV channel) for Russian-speaking audiences. Its mission has been explicitly formulated as a 
response to “complex challenges involving Russia” where Current Time’s aim would be to provide 
coverage of “events that are not reported, or are misreported, by the Kremlin-affiliated media.., to 
provide a reality check on the disinformation…, and to advance U.S. national interests” (RFE/RL, 
n.d.). Both RFE/RL and Current Time TV were added to a list of “foreign agents” by Russia’s 
Ministry of Justice. 
 
Russia’s public diplomacy media 
The Russian media system has been described as neo-Soviet, including “a rejection of 
balance or objectivity; flaws in media law; self-censorship; government interference and 
harassment of media outlets” (Oates 2007: 1279), and neo-authoritarian (Becker 2004). Becker 
identifies its following key characteristics: predominance of state-owned media with limited 
autonomy, direct and indirect control over media messages, strategic use of broadcast media and 
particularly television, and a weak legal system that means minimal media protection. The state 
remains the major actor in Russian news media (Vartanova 2015). In recent years, Russia 
reintroduced criminal defamation and put significant pressure on oppositional voices and blogs. 
Free expression is under threat according to Human Rights Watch (2019), with the exclusion of 
opposition candidates from city assembly elections in Moscow and use of excessive force against 
protesters.  
Information technologies and media are central to how Russia understands and 
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increasingly applies ‘soft power’ in foreign policy (Sergunin and Karabeshkin 2015), and 
consequently, to how it understands external threats and solutions to them. President Putin (2012) 
defined soft power as “promoting one’s interests and policies through persuasion”, which has 
translated into Russian PD initiatives that use a combination of international broadcasting and 
web-based social networks to engage foreign publics (Simons 2014). For example, Russian media 
organisations with large audiences in post-Soviet states have been instrumental in pursuing 
regional dominance (Szostek 2018a). Recent scholarship has examined Russian external 
propaganda activities, particularly in Eastern Europe and Ukraine (Szostek 2018b; Miazhevich 
2014) and in digital spaces (Aro 2016; Kim et al 2018). However, scholars have also described as 
problematic the labelling of all Russian PD media output as propaganda or assuming central 
coordination of all Russia’s media messages by the Kremlin (Hutchings and Tolz 2020).While 
incorporating some of the old Soviet practices, Russia’s PD has been described as pragmatic and 
profit-oriented rather than ideological (Lukyanov 2013).  
We focus on RT, Russia’s primary multimedia and multi-language external broadcaster 
launched in 2005 as Russia Today and rebranded RT in 2009. Journalist Peter Pomerantsev, a 
prominent critic of RT, describes it as “Russia’s answer to BBC World and Al Jazeera” (2014: 
46). RT sees its mission in “acquaint[ing] international audiences with a Russian viewpoint on 
major global events” (RT, n.d.) – effectively, claiming to provide alternative rather than unbiased 
coverage. Between 2005-2013, the Russian government spent $2 billion on RT (Zavadski 2015). 
Most employees are American, but senior positions are Russian, enabling claims that Russian 
authorities are involved in editorial and staffing decisions and censorship (Gray 2014). Liz Wahl, 
the former RT journalist who resigned on air in 2014, argued that its true aim is to generate 
“confusion and sow distrust in Western governments and institutions by reporting anything which 
seems to discredit the West, and ignoring anything which is to its credit” (Wahl 2016). The work 
of RT is often critiqued as centered on the creation of uncertainty and doubt, promotion of anti-
establishment sentiment, and stimulation of conspiracy theories (see Yablokov 2015), while US 
PD media, although claiming truth and accuracy as well as greater journalist autonomy, are 
frequently accused of ignoring alternative cultural and political contexts and aiming to persuade 
rather than build dialogue (Comor and Bean 2012). 
Both RFE/RL and RT perform PD functions, even though both maintain a claim to 
objective and professional journalism. RFE/RL mission has been described as a “surrogate 
broadcaster” – offering an alternative to the government- or party-controlled media in Eastern 
Europe and giving voice to dissident views, otherwise unavailable to those audiences (see 
Puddington 2000). As Russia’s PD broadcasters were created, however, RT adopted a similar 
claim, hiring “dissident” broadcasters within the West (such as Chris Hedges and George 
Galloway for the UK), and quoting prominent critics of Western governments, to claim they cover 
viewpoints, actions and events that Western governments try to downplay or hide from their 
domestic audiences. The 2018 ruling of UK media regulator Ofcom that RT broke impartiality 
rules, and the 2014 accusations by the US State Department that RT was a “propaganda bullhorn” 
were repeatedly represented by RT as “coming under fire” for professional journalism that 
contributes to democratic accountability in the West (e.g. RT 2014). Despite operational 
differences, RT and RFE/RL claim to expose Western and Russian misinformation and focus their 
media discourse on propaganda threat and power. 
6 
 
Method 
We examine the representation of propaganda activities in policy documents and PD media 
output during the recent period of growing tensions in US-Russia relations (2013-2019). The 
combination of governmental and PD media sources reveals the formulation, legitimation and 
reproduction of propaganda as a political tool and a societal threat by diverse power actors, and 
the projection of these formulations to external target audiences. Atkinson and Coffey (2004: 58-
59) refer to policy documents and media output as ‘social facts’, which are produced in socially 
organized ways and associated with distinct social occasions, therefore offering rich evidence of 
constructed realities and discourse. 
We reviewed documents for 2013-2019 that establish legal frameworks and strategic 
policy visions for media and information regulation across US Congressional legislation and 
Russian State Duma digital archive, together with national strategic documents specifically 
relating to propaganda activities. For the US, these include US International Communications 
Reform Act 2015 (H.R.2323), Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act 2016 
(H.R.5181), Intelligence Community Assessment “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in 
Recent US Elections” 2017, and National Cyber Strategy 2018. Russia’s key documents include 
Mass Media Law (2013 version), Foreign Policy Concept 2016, Doctrine of Information Security 
2016, and the 2019 Federal Law on Amending Article 15-3 of the Federal Law on Information, 
Information Technologies and Protection of Information (the latter also known as anti-fake news 
law). These documents were examined for key thematic frameworks – a process which involves 
identifying, evaluating and interpreting policy descriptions of pre-selected issues and noting 
emerging patterns (Srivastava and Thomson 2009). Specifically, we investigated how policy 
documents represented propaganda threats and targets, attributed propaganda activities to specific 
actors, spoke of their own vs. foreign propaganda activities, and defined propaganda effect on 
audiences. The documents were uneven – offering extensive data on some of these issues and 
devoting less attention to others (Bowen 2009). For example, Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept 
situated PD activities specifically within foreign policy contexts while the Doctrine of Information 
Security 2016 and US National Cyber Strategy largely spoke of domestic online vulnerabilities. 
However, taken together, these documents regulate state interpretations and responses to 
propaganda threats across various policy domains. 
The selection of PD media articles focused on three periods: May-August 2014 when US 
and Russia widely accused each other of propaganda campaigns over Ukraine; December 2016-
February 2017 when PD media speculated on the changes to the US-Russia relationship just before 
and after Donald Trump’s inauguration; and March-April 2019 when media attention to 
propaganda was revived by the public release of the redacted version of the Mueller Report. Data 
was collected directly from RFE/RL and RT websites using keyword “propaganda” as it is 
specifically the construction of propaganda, its threat and power that this article examines1. 
Following an initial screening that identified articles which discussed US and Russia’s propaganda 
at length rather than simply mentioned it, a total of 135 articles were selected for analysis – 90 for 
RFE/RL (15 each for the English- and Russian-language RFE/RL which differ in target audiences 
 
1
 Including other keywords, such as fake news or misinformation, would have produced a larger dataset but blur its 
focus, by reorienting it from the Russia-US propaganda activities to domestic media bias debates and political attacks 
on “fake news” by the Trump administration.  
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and content, in each period), and 45 for RT (15 in each period).  
Using thematic framework and critical discourse analysis (CDA), we then compared how 
the representation of US and Russian propaganda activities differed between RFE/RL and RT, and 
between these PD media and policy documents. As a “theory and method of analysing the way 
individuals and institutions use language” (Richardson 2007: 1), CDA can capture constructions 
of power, domination, and (in)security at a given moment in political and social life (Fairclough 
2001; van Dijk 1993). We examined a range of factors, including naming of propaganda actors; 
construction of self/other boundaries and moral differentiations between ‘our’ and ‘their’ 
propaganda; representation of actions and victims; formulations of threat and security; metaphors; 
and dominant sourcing and news structures. 
 
Construction of the Propaganda Threat 
Concerns about “propaganda”, “fake news” and misinformation have been named a matter of 
national security and a priority in foreign policy in both Russia and the US in recent years. The 
threat is formulated similarly in both US and Russian documents, as foreign influence that 
undermines stability, national interests and civil/democratic society. However, the source of threat 
and its perceived target or victim are formulated differently.  
US documents suggest that “disinformation and other propaganda… undermine the 
national security objectives”, cause a “destabilizing effect on United States allies and interests” 
(H.R.5181), “undermine faith in the US Government and fuel political protest” (Intelligence 
Community Assessment 2017), and “sow discord in our democratic processes” (National Cyber 
Strategy 2018). Propaganda is situated externally, as “foreign misinformation” and “foreign 
propaganda” (including in the title of H.R.5181 Countering Foreign Propaganda and 
Disinformation Act) and as “malign foreign influence operations” (National Cyber Strategy 2018). 
“Foreign propaganda” is frequently assigned to particular countries, for example Russia and China 
(H.R.5181). National Cyber Strategy (2018) directly blames Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, 
along with non-state actors such as terrorist networks, for conducting “reckless cyber attacks… to 
profit, recruit, propagandize” as a way to “challenge the United States, its allies, and partners”. 
The target of external propaganda and disinformation is conceptualized in the language of foreign 
policy and existing alliances: as the “US and Western governments” or the “US and key allies and 
partners” (Intelligence Community Assessment 2017). The overall understanding of propaganda in 
US policy documents is that of a tool of foreign state and non-state influence against the West, 
that threatens national interests and security.   
Russian documents portray propaganda as threatening  to “destabilize the internal political 
and social situation”, exert “information pressure on the population, primarily on the Russian 
youth… to erode Russian traditional spiritual and moral values” (Doctrine of Information Security 
2016), and create “possibilities for mass violations of public order or public security” (Federal 
Law on Amending Article 15-3, 2019). The reference to youth is important: mobilizing on social 
media, it was a noticeable group behind Russian protests in 2011-2013, 2017 and 2019, while the 
Kremlin has devoted increasing attention to establishing pro-governmental youth organizations 
and pushing for “patriotic upbringing” and education (Hemment 2015; Khvostunova 2019). 
“Information pressure” from abroad presents youth discontent as external manipulation and a 
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matter of security and sovereignty. Other propaganda threats include the more general spreading 
of “information which negatively influences civil society” (Mass Media Law 2013) and 
undermining Russia’s “information security” and “stability” (Foreign Policy Concept 2016). 
“Foreign” in Russian documents is used to denote the externality of communications, 
misinformation, and target audiences, but with no indication of locations or countries. The 
Doctrine of Information Security (2016) speaks of “certain states” and “a number of foreign 
countries” trying to “undermine the Russian Federation and its allies”; yet the external threat 
remains faceless and broadly defined. Instead, the origin and target of propaganda can be 
anywhere: Foreign Policy Concept (2016) speaks of a “global information space” where 
information becomes increasingly exposed to manipulation. The document names cyber security 
and addressing “threats involving the use of information and communication technology” among 
Russia’s foreign policy priorities.  
PD media closely echo formulations of threat found in the official documents. RFE/RL 
sees the purpose of Russian propaganda in “undermining the U.S. electoral system”, “meddl[ing] 
in the democratic process”, “openly agitating for a US election candidate”, “creating a crescent of 
instability”, “destabilizing the West itself”, turning “Western democracy into a weapon against 
Western democracy”, “spreading Euroscepticism and anti-Americanism”, “crystallizing anti-
establishment ideas”, “deliberately mislead[ing] and inflam[ing] television audiences”, and 
“divert[ing] attention” from Russia’s breaking international norms. Russian-language RFE/RL 
similarly accused Russian PD media of “trying to split the West”, “spreading fake news” that are 
picked up by US right-wing media, “corrupting local politicians, journalists and public opinion 
leaders”, and weaponizing and “sabotaging information”. These threats speak to both external and 
internal target audiences: they validate rising nationalist/military rhetoric in Eastern Europe about 
Russia’s “destabilization of the West”, and at the same time explain Western popular discontent 
with their political and economic elites (“anti-establishment ideas”) as RT’s encouragement of 
Brexit, Trump and Le Pen supporters to seek radical change. The major aim of foreign propaganda, 
according to RFE/RL, is inherently (geo)political - an “attempt to fragment internally our societies, 
perhaps distort our political processes, and to sow discontent and a lack of cohesion across the 
allies” (RFE/RL 2016a). This is also an activity in which Russia is portrayed as (geo)politically 
isolated: “Russia’s powerful propaganda campaign is alarming the rest of the world” (RFE/RL 
2016b; emphasis added). The narrative of a morally isolated neo-Soviet autocracy and America 
leading the “free world” is also dominant in domestic US mainstream media (Tsygankov 2017).  
RT was much less specific about threats posed by Western propaganda activities to the 
Russian national audience. Instead, it portrayed Western media coverage as threatening Western 
populations with uncertainty and deception: “Whatever Russian news media are accused of 
regarding fake news it is incomparable to the massive, systematic scale of fabrications and 
distortions churned out by the news media in NATO member countries” (RT 2017a). RT 
highlighted contradictions between media and government statements on several US officials’ 
alleged ties to Russian interests during the Mueller investigation. After the release of the Mueller 
Report, RT represented “Trump/Russia hoax” and Putin’s negative image in the US as “slick 
propaganda for the [American] masses”. It is not surprising that RT portrayed propaganda as a 
threat to Western, rather than Russian national audiences, as RT’s target audience is in the West. 
RFE/RL’s application of propaganda threats mostly to Western publics and democracy may be 
more surprising since its main target audience is in Eastern Europe. Yet while it was the West who 
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appeared under threat, RFE/RL transmitted an image of Russia as an isolated perpetrator – an 
unstable state “founded on corruption and deceitful propaganda” (RFE/RL 2019a) – and thus 
supported oppositional voices within the country. 
The construction of propaganda threats between Russian and US documents and media is 
similar in two important aspects. First, propaganda is portrayed as a threat to the state (and its 
international standing), through society. Society that has been “corrupted” by propaganda, itself 
can become a source of danger, as seen in the representations of Russian youth and Western anti-
establishment sentiments. Second, by justifying internal problems as external, the state is portrayed 
as the entity that can (and is called upon to) provide security as a matter of defense – an important 
consideration in how the emerging response is framed.  
 
All-powerful Propaganda and Objectification of Audiences  
Russian and American documents and PD media assert widespread use of propaganda by external 
powers in pursuit of national interest but devote surprisingly little attention to questioning its actual 
real-world impacts. In our sample, the opponent’s propaganda is claimed to jeopardize national 
security, societal cohesion and state stability in many ways, but the power of external agents to 
successfully deliver these threats and manipulate public opinion is usually only assumed. An 
impression of propaganda as all-powerful and effective is communicated through language that 
portrays propaganda threats as omnipresent and imagines audiences as uncritical and 
disempowered recipients of information.  
The language of PD media and official documents in both countries widely utilizes 
metaphors to describe propaganda activities. These are mostly scientific and technology-related 
(describing propaganda as “operation”; “technology”; “machine”, “mechanism”, “technology”, 
“tool”) or war-related (involving “adversaries”, “attacks”, “escalations”, “aggression”, 
“deterrence”, “detection”, “battlefield”, “firing broadsides”, “sabotage”). Metaphors create 
feelings and emotions (Charteris-Black 2011), in this case contributing to the impression of 
propaganda as unknown and sophisticated power beyond an average person’s comprehension, and 
as a conflict in which citizens inevitably turn to the state for protection. Facelessness of a threat 
multiplies its potential agents, making the threat seem omnipresent and the audience powerless to 
avoid it. This makes enemy constructions more appealing, as they can attribute faceless threats to 
certain, known, even if feared objects (see Chernobrov 2019). 
The framing of audiences as incapable of recognising and fighting propaganda is a 
common thread in RFE/RL and RT coverage. Both media rarely detail the effect of propaganda 
on the public or discuss how it might be addressed without recourse to state control. When 
audiences are mentioned, it is usually to contrast the powerlessness of the public against the 
capabilities of the government. RT (2017c), for example, suggests that “people can’t defend 
themselves” against propaganda, therefore “we need government responsibility” and more 
education. RFE/RL (2016b) closely echoes this view, depicting populations who “cannot filter” 
information and therefore cannot be held responsible for falling victim to propaganda. 
The effect on audiences is assumed throughout Russian and US policy documents to be 
vast and unobstructed, with audiences playing passive roles of information recipients and easily 
manipulated objects. Mere exposure to propaganda is assumed to be enough to cause suitable 
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perception and behavior (persuade citizens to engage in protest, disrupt stability, vote differently). 
A number of media literacy initiatives in the US point at the public’s frequent failure to distinguish 
between sponsored content and news stories, particularly online (see Media Literacy Now, n.d.). 
The assumption of vast propaganda power is reminiscent of the “third person effect” in psychology 
(Davison 1983), where others are assumed to be easily influenced whereas oneself is affected less 
or not at all. The only attempt to evidence effect on audiences in both countries’ policy documents 
is made in Intelligence Community Assessment (2017) and is numerical as it presumes that large 
audience size or its increase imply belief in the message: “RT’s most popular English language 
video about the President-elect… featured Assange and had 2.2 million views”; “RT recently was 
the most-watched foreign news channel in the UK”; “RT had the most rapid growth… audience 
in New York tripled and in Washington DC grew by 60%” (emphasis added). The same approach 
is used to measure the influence of American PD media abroad (see Broadcasting Board of 
Governors 2017).  
Yet, the numbers alone can be misleading. RT’s reach and persuasive power are likely 
exaggerated by RT itself, through bots and social media algorithms (Woolley and Howard 2017) 
and by those invested in portraying Russia as a threat.While RT claims to be among the top 5 pan-
European news channels (RT, n.d.), Broadcasters’ Audience Research Board (2017) ratings for 
UK viewership remain low, and some assert that RT’s only tangible success is in selected Arab 
countries (Zavadski 2015). Moreover, RT’s most popular YouTube videos are unrelated to politics 
(Zavadski 2015), making it hard to estimate political influence. Pomerantsev (2014) states that the 
network’s popularity  stems not from overt propaganda but from “other” news. For example, RT 
was nominated for the International Emmy Award for their coverage of Barack Obama’s visit to 
Russia, the Occupy movement, and Guantanamo Bay hunger strikes. 
Many scholars note difficulty in measuring propaganda effect and influence (see 
Miskimmon et al. 2014; Pamment 2012; Zaller 1996); and assumptions of impact on public 
opinion from mere exposure, audience size, or number of views have also been criticized (Ladd 
and Lenz 2009; Shrum 2009). Yet such limitations of measuring effect rarely enter public or 
political discourse. Propaganda, particularly with digital technology, has become a “fetish” that 
drives a large industry for PR contractors in defense (Awan et al. 2019). The focus on “outputs 
rather than impacts” (Rawnsley 2015) drives investment in state-sponsored solutions in both 
Russia and the US. Sense of threat has been linked to the “escalation of patriotic sentiment” (van 
der Toorn et al. 2014: 21), which may explain increased public support for national security 
investment. 
 
Representation of Self/Other’s Propaganda Activities 
Both Russia and the US contrast their own PD efforts against the opponent’s propaganda threat. 
Among the US documents, the International Communications Reform Act of 2015 (HR 2323) and 
the Intelligence Community Assessment (2017) draw a clear self/other comparison. American PD 
broadcasters are described as a “reliable source of accurate, objective, and comprehensive news” 
(H.R.2323). Combined with the emphasis on “foreign propaganda”, this description further 
externalizes propaganda as a practice and strengthens claims the US only disseminates “fact-based 
narratives”. Foreign PD media – RT in particular – are described as a “state-run propaganda 
machine”. Lexically, RT is represented negatively with words “rapid expansion”; “candid 
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statements”; “conquer the audience”; “fuel discontent”; “aggressively advertise”; “avoid 
regulations” (Intelligence Community Assessment 2017). 
Russian documents see the role of Russian PD media in “information support for foreign 
policy activities” which includes “delivery to the international community of unbiased information 
about Russia’s perspective on key international issues, its foreign policy initiatives and efforts” 
(Foreign Policy Concept 2016). The Doctrine of Information Security (2016) similarly names 
“providing the Russian and international community with reliable information” as the “national 
interest in the information sphere”. The documents do not call these activities propaganda, but 
describe Russia’s actions as “develop[ing] its own effective ways to influence foreign audiences” 
in an attempt to ensure “the right of every person to access unbiased information and various points 
of view” (Foreign Policy Concept 2016). Russia’s own information activities are portrayed as a 
positive influence, as opposed to the “negative influence” from external threats (Mass Media Law 
2013). Yet unlike the US, Russian documents explicitly connect “unbiased information” with the 
state perspective – an approach which echoes RT’s mission and Russia’s understanding of both 
media roles and “soft power [as] an integral part of efforts to achieve foreign policy objectives” 
(Foreign Policy Concept 2016). 
Our PD media sample showed that both RFE/RL and RT blamed the other for being state-
funded, while portraying itself as independent and objective. RFE/RL called RT a “state-backed 
Russian channel” and “a pillar of a Kremlin campaign to meddle in the [US] presidential election”. 
This was contrasted against RFE/RL’s self-description as “an independent corporation funded by 
the U.S. Congress. The U.S. government is not involved in its operational or editorial decisions.” 
(RFE/RL 2017). Besides independence, RFE/RL praised itself for “accurate” and “fearless 
reporting”, despite “relentless intimidation and threats by Russian security forces”, particularly in 
the coverage of Russia’s actions in the Crimea (RFE/RL 2019b).  
RT created a similar contrast: “RFE/RL is among the oldest state-funded media outlets in 
the world” (RT 2017b). RT repeatedly described itself as autonomous and non-commercial news 
media, “singled out lately by the US intelligence” for “presenting valid alternative perspectives on 
a range of international issues” and being “basically independent, doing things differently”. RT 
belittled and deflected propaganda accusations in line with its “Question More” slogan: good 
journalism would always be victimized because of challenging elite interests, and true propaganda 
is in the other’s attempts to avoid uncomfortable questions. In turn, RFE/RL accused Russia’s 
media of not seeing the difference between journalism and propaganda (RFE/RL 2014). 
Both RT and RFE/RL constructed a victimized narrative of professional journalism on the 
defense. However, while RT portrayed itself and Russia under attack, it maintained an image of 
journalistic and national strength and resilience – directly relating to how Russia sees its 
international role as a challenger to US hegemony. In RFE/RL’s reporting, the West appeared 
passive, uncertain and unprepared for foreign propaganda, despite heavy spending on information 
warfare and PD post-9/11. Yet, instead of presenting a vice, these qualities were built into a 
narrative of virtuous democratic vulnerability – the West as a leader who should expect to be 
challenged and as a priori vulnerable because it is pluralist and diverse, and because propaganda 
and deception are taking new, digital, unexpected, ever penetrating forms. RFE/RL spoke of the 
“West suffering from one of its worst crises of confidence”, “getting increasingly nervous” and 
having “an air of helplessness”, and reported calls to take a more decisive stance, “to ensure no 
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foreign meddling in the [next] election”. PD media representations of self/other propaganda 
activities therefore resonate with how Russia and the US position themselves in the international 
system, intertwining with their other strategic narratives and discursive constructions of hierarchy 
in world politics.  
 
Conclusion 
This study has explored US and Russia’s mutual representation of propaganda activities in 
policy documents and PD media during the period of growing political tensions (2013-2019). The 
US and Russia have different media and political systems and PD media configurations, yet we 
have demonstrated that their discourses about propaganda are similar in prioritizing state-centered 
threats and responses and disempowering audiences. Both Russia and the US regard propaganda 
and misinformation activities as a tool of foreign policy. Foreign propaganda is represented as 
threatening the state through society – jeopardizing national security, threatening existing 
international alliances, undermining electoral systems and trust in democracy, destabilizing 
government through unrest. Audiences, while being the vehicle through which propaganda power 
materializes, appear passive – mere objects in a tug-of-war between the US and Russia and their 
PD media, incapable of resisting propaganda or developing civil society initiatives to strengthen 
independent journalism. The role of domestic systems appears clearly underappreciated by the US 
and Russian policymakers and PD media, who frame audiences through the prism of the 
‘hypodermic needle’ model of propaganda, although propaganda has evolved beyond one-
directional media communications into interactive, networked power struggles. 
We have also argued that the US and Russia’s discourses about propaganda should be 
theorized as interacting, co-constitutive discourses that, in their current form, are unlikely to 
produce a solution to real tensions and foreign policy problems. The way propaganda is framed 
and (de)legitimized is important for understanding political rhetoric, public attitudes, and policy 
responses. Our analysis demonstrates that US and Russia’s discourses about propaganda are 
securitized – ‘dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus, by labelling it as 
security, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means’ (Buzan et 
al.1998: 26). The threats of propaganda, digital interference, and manipulation are now a major 
part of discourse about US-Russia relationship, presented as a matter of national and international 
security and framed in war language.  
However, securitization of an issue can itself pose a threat as it creates opportunities for 
actors to use it in their own interests. Both the Kremlin and the White House have pursued 
domestic political interests by presenting critical media reporting as “fake news” and calling for 
increased defense spending in the “information war”. Heightened fear of increasingly sophisticated 
and digital propaganda can bolster calls for stronger state regulation of information and the Internet 
and drive a propaganda “arms race” as each side tries to outdo the other. Propaganda accusations 
and hostile political rhetoric contribute to popular suspicion on both sides, limiting opportunities 
for restoring dialogue. Already 71% of Americans view Russia as a threat (Reuters/Ipsos 2018), 
while 80% of Russians consider the US and NATO as a threat and overwhelmingly believe that 
Russia is unjustly accused of influencing the US election (Pew Research Centre 2018). PD media 
too, further strengthen the impression that the realm of propaganda and counterpropaganda is now 
the default media playground – to the point of suggesting that “all news is fake” (Pomerantsev 
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2014: 49). Amplifying the “propaganda threat” without offering transparency and non-dominative 
solutions to the problem is also likely to deepen public distrust of media and disenchantment with 
democracy that has grown in recent years. 
Finally, this analysis of the propaganda representations in the US-Russia relationship may 
be relevant to the broader discourse about disinformation and propaganda among other 
international actors. The recent trade war between the US and China, too, has been accompanied 
by increased attention to surveillant propaganda activities. The geopolitical and historical context 
of this relationship is different, yet the emerging discourse around propaganda already displays 
similarly simplistic framing. Routines, familiar representations and well-rehearsed policy 
responses present appealing solutions in times of uncertainty (Mitzen 2006; Chernobrov 2016), 
and consequently, we can learn from this public discourse around the US-Russia propaganda 
relationship to better communicate policy solutions and empower audiences as information 
warfare is becoming more ubiquitous. 
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